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Procedural and Substantive Fairness in
Landfill Siting: A Swiss Case Study*
Ortwin Renn, Thomas Webler & Hans Kastenholz**

Introduction
Modern democratic societies with pluralistic value systems tend to
emphasize procedural justice over substantive fairness since the various
actors in society disagree about what is a just and fair solution and what
ratio of payoffs and risks is regarded as acceptable. 1 Because
disagreement is difficult or even impossible to resolve by abstract
reasoning, the minimum requirement for a fair solution is procedural
equity. 2 The process of legitimizing decisions by procedure rather
than substance, however, faces two major problems: First, regardless of
the type of procedure selected, its content relies on the discussion of
substantive issues that will surface as part of the discussion or debate
*
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Populist Reforms 29ff (1991); and George Cvetkovitch, Charles Vlek & Timothy C.
Earle, Designing Technological Hazard Information Programs: Towards a Model of
Risk-Adaptive Decision Making, in Social Decision Methodology for Technological
Projects 253, 262 ff (C. Vlek & C. Cvetkovich eds. 1989).
2 Niklas Luhmann, Soziologie des politischen Systems, 20 Kiolner Zeitschrift
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Science and Technology (1988)
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within the selected procedure. Even an acceptably fair risk discourse
might produce unacceptable risk sharing. 3 For this reason, we believe
that procedural fairness in risk decision making must be supplemented
with competence. Competence in this sense means that the outcomes
will lead to results that people expected when the decision was made.
Competence can be evaluated only after the fact but must be assured
during deliberations, i.e. it must be based on the best available
judgment at the time. For this reason, it is important that the "state of
the art" in assessing outcomes and consequences and exploring their
distributional effects is incorporated in the process. As Kristen ShraderFrechette points out, knowledge about inequities and subjective
perceptions of those who will bear risks need to be combined with the
4
best scientific risk estimate.
Second, procedural solutions of fairness are faced with the plurality
of substantive fairness concepts within the discourse of the participants.
Substantive fairness is not easy to define: Young 5 distinguishes three
basic principles of substantive fairness: equal distribution of resources
among all constituents (egalitarianism); distribution of resources
according to each person's merits or input (proportionality to
contribution); distribution of resources according to some priority
principle such as each person's needs (distribution rule). Economists
have complimented this list of principles with one significant addition:
envy-free distributions. A distribution meets this principle if none of the
individuals involved would like to change its share with any other
person's share. 6 The question of which principle ought to be selected
depends on personal or cultural preferences and social context.
To resolve competing claims with respect to substantive fairness,
one needs rules of how to specify which of these claims will eventually
prevail. 7 A procedure that does not include rules for evaluating and
3 Douglas MacLean, Social Values and the Distribution of Risk, in Values at Risk
75 (D. Maclean ed. 1986).
4
Shrader-Frechette, supra note 1, at 32ff.
5 H. Peyton Young, Equity in Theory and Practice (1993).
6 William J. Baumol, Superfairness: Applications and Theory (1986); cf empirical
analysis in Robin L. Keller & R. K. Sarin, Equity in Social Risk: Some empirical
Observations,8 RiskAnal. 135 (1988).
7 Vittorio Ha3sle, The Greatness and Limits of Kant's PracticalPhilosophy, 13(2)
Grad. Faculty Phil. J. 13 (1990).
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selecting competing claims and arguments misses its point. It either
confines decision making to voting, i.e. an approximation of a collective
utility maximization strategy (in this way taking sides for one principle
of fairness), or it leaves the process to random variations hoping that the
life-world experiences of the participants will provide sufficient
reasoning for finding a solution that fits all needs. 8 Providing a
platform for affected parties does not resolve the conflicts about the
substantive nature of fair distributions unless rules for making validity
claims and the selection of default options or reference points are
clearly defined and adopted. These rules may be jointly established by
all participants, without such rules, however, any discourse procedure
becomes an unpredictable game of strategic maneuvering and privileges
the strategically superior and rhetorically skilled actors.
In our attempt to design discourse procedures in which the affected
groups are given the opportunity to be equally represented (as
demanded by the egalitarian interpretation of procedural equity), we
deliberately postulated a set of rules regarding substantive issues. These
rules do not presuppose the dominance of one philosophical school of
fairness and social justice over another school but is oriented towards a
pragmatic procedure that gives all schools of though an equal chance of
being considered for evaluating the fairness of a decision option. These
rules refer to the following two principles:
* If all affected parties have equal access to the benefits
and risks of a proposed solution, i.e. nobody is losin,
compared to other actors, the situation is called "equitable'
by default and does not need any further justification. This
means that we select the egalitarian principle as the starting
point of discussion, not necessarily the endpoint. Depending
on the distribution context, equality may refer to chances or
to outcomes or both.
0 If one affected party benefits more from one solution
than any other party or one party is asked to take a lager
share of the risk than any other party, this solution warrants
justification. Such situations may still be judged fair if the
privilege of one party and the surplus risk of another party
can be justified by arguments to which both parties agree
8 Jirgen Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action (1991); Karl
Otto Apel, Normatively Grounding "Critical Theory" Through Recourse to the
Lifeworld? A Transcendental-PragmaticAttempt to Think with Habermas against
Habermas, in Philosophical Interventions in the Unfinisched Project of
Enlightenment 125 (A. Honneth et al., eds. 1992).
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(such as merits, needs, priority, or envy-free solutions). Such
arguments can only be sustained if the inequitable solution
provides additional benefits to which both parties can
ascribe. All participants need to agree that the additional
benefits coming from an inequitable solution must
overcompensate the disbenefits associated with the
inequalities stemming from this particular solution.
These major rules are derived from the meta-principle that all
humans are created equal and should have an equal share of the world's
resources in the absense of good reasons. This is congruent with most
equality principles, including Aristotle's or Rawl's Maximin principle,
although his reliance on contracts alone do not legitimize inequitable
solutions. 9 Beyond voluntary agreements, the situation in which the
agreement is prepared needs to be free of coercion and should be
unrelated to the status quo.
Here we present the empirical results from one attempt to design
and implement a discourse to site an incinerated municipal solid waste
landfill. The process may be seen as a practical implementation of the
ideal procedural equity expressed in discourse ethic philosophy 10 but
is structured to include checks to competence and substantive fairness.
Background of the Case
The topic for this case study is public participation in a decision
making process about siting a municipal waste disposal facility (landfill)
in the eastern region of Aargau Canton. Figure 1 illustrates the location
and the size of the Canton together with sites for existing and planned
landfills. The Building Department (Baudepartement) in Aargau is
charged with responsibility to design the canton's solid waste disposal
plan, but the municipalities are responsible for implementing the
plan. 11 In fact, however, communities have neither the resources nor
the inclination to initiate or implement such planning. Instead, they
9 John Bawls, A Theory of Justice (1971).
10 E.g., Jtirgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action: Vol. 1 Reason
and the Rationalization of Society (1984).
11 Aargau has an official policy to incinerate 100% of its solid municipal waste. This
is accompanied by mandatory recycling of compostable waste, batteries, appliances,
and metal; and voluntary recycling of newspaper (curbside pickup by volunteers),
glass, tin cans, and PET plastic containers (at local self-service bins located near
residential areas, usually quite accessible even without a car).
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officially ask the Canton to assume the responsibility of design and
siting. This was the case in Aargau.
Figure 1
Information about the Canton Aargau and Location of Solid Waste Facilities

Switzerland

X incinerator
A landfill: in operation
*
landfill: in licensing phase
O3 landfill: under construction

/0
0

15 miles
eleven sites
that meet minimal standards
the five remaing sites for
further investigation
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The Building Department's plan for the eastern region included the
siting of at least one, but perhaps as many as three new landfills. Before
our involvement in the project, the Building Department characterized
the need for new disposal facilities and chose potential sites through a
mapping-elimination process. Federal and cantonal laws restrict siting
landfills in parks, wetlands, inhabited areas, geologically unsound areas
and so on. These areas were removed from the map, leaving 32
potential sites. To narrow the list to thirteen sites, the Department
developed a set of "preference criteria" and rated each site. Six
categories of criteria were used: geology, hydrogeology, utility
requirements, settlement-recreation, land and nature protection and
existing use value of land. These steps were done without consultation
with the communities. We entered the process just as the results of the
mapping elimination process were made public. The selection of
thirteen potential sites was the product of Phase 1 of selection.
In Phase 2, the main task was to limit the choice to three to five
eligible sites. These sites should be selected and prioritized as a result of
the geological surveys and the discourse recommendations. This was
accomplished in 1993. The present Phase 3 includes detailed geological
investigations in conjunction with citizen panels in each site. After one
to three sites are finally chosen, the legally binding licensing procedure
will be initiated. This includes a formal environmental impact
statement, a public hearing and a final vote by the State parliament
(Phase 4). All four phases are illustrated in Table 1.
Our mandate was to organize a participatory decision process for
Phase 2. The objectives were to: develop criteria for comparing the
different sites, evaluate the geological data that were collected during
that period, eliminate the sites that should not be further considered
and to prioritize the remaining sites with respect to suitability to host a
landfill. We managed to meet these objectives between November
1992 and September 1993.
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Table 1
The Four Phases of Site Evaluation and Decision Making
Evaluation
Phase I

Evaluation
Phase H

Evaluation
Phase 1H

Getting a
Permit

Exclusion of
non-suitable
areas for siting
a landfill

8 citizens
1 from each
potential site
community

Detailed
geological
surveys

Environmental
inpact
analysis

Geological
surveys

Selection of sites
by panels in each
of the remaining
towns

Public Hearing

Rough
analysis for 32
potential sites:
selection of 13
eligible sites

1991

1992

Vote by State
Parliament

Recommendation
of a priority list
of three sites by
the panels
1993

1994

Time

Applying the Cooperative Discourse Model for the Swiss Case Study
In line with our understanding of fairness, we convinced the
cantonal government that the default option for our process should be a
solution in which each community would take care of its own waste. If
our efforts to find a common solution failed, each community should
be responsible for managing its own waste. This fall-back position was
difficult to justify since most waste for the proposed landfill would
come from an incinerator rather than from private households in each
community. It was feasible, however, to distribute the bottom and fly
ash from the two operating incinerators to each community according
to the share of waste that they contributed. The default option was
explained to the citizens of the four panels. The cantonal government
announced it would hand the authority back to each community in the
case that no common solution could be accomplished.
Once the default option was defined, we structured the process of
decision making in accordance with our model of cooperative discourse
that we have developed for resolving environmental problems over the
last 12 years. 1 2 Our model of participatory decision making is an
12 Ortwin Renn et al., An Empirical Investigation of Citizens' Preferences Among
Four Energy Scenarios, 26 Tech. Forecasting & Soc. Change 11 (1984); Ortwin
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attempt to develop procedural rules for organizing and structuring a
discourse that is based on the communication model advocated by
Critical Theory. 13 Discourses in Critical Theory serve the purpose of
finding common solutions on cognitive, intentional, affective and
normative problems. To emphasize fairness, the structure of the
14
discourse has to be based on the following characteristics:
* egalitarian position of each party within the discourse
(all parties have equal rights and obligations);
* each party has the right to make claims of all kinds
(cognitive, normative, intentional, etc.)
* eaclh party has the same right to demand the
redemption of claims and ask for justification;
* all parties jointly create or confirm rules for redeeming
claims
In our model of decision making, these rules are adopted by all
participants in the beginning of the process and confirmed throughout
the process. Different sets of rules are proposed for cognitive
(instrumental rationality), intentional (promises and practices) and
normative debates (social rationality). These rules need to be adopted
by unanimous vote.
Our model of cooperative discourse reflects these basic discourse
requirements and offers a structure to make them operational in a given
policy context. The main features of the model are: First, we insist that
all parties affected by a decision should have an equal opportunity to
participate in the decision making process. Second, each party
participating in the discourse has equal rights and duties and is obliged
to provide evidence for its claims. Third, we require that the best
available knowledge is integrated into the decision process to ensure
competency. Last, we suggest a rational procedure of decision making
Renn et al., Sozialvertrgliche Energiepolitik. En Gutachten fiit die Bundesregierung
(1985); Ortwin Renn, Thomas Webler & Branden Johnson, Public Participationin
Hazard Management: The Use of Citizen Panels in the U.S., 2 Risk 197, 198-226
(1991); and Ortwin Renn et al., Public Participationin Decision Making: A ThreeStep-Procedure, 26 PolicySciences 189 (1993).
13 Habermas, supra note 10; Jiirgen Habermas,The Theory of Communicative
Action: Vol. 2 System and Lifeworld (1987); and J~irgen Habermas, The
Philosophical Discourse of Modernity (1990).
14 Ortwin Renn, Risk Communication: Towards a Rational Dialogue with the
Public, 29 J. Haz. Materials 465 (1992); Ortwin Renn & Thomas Webler,
Anticipating Conflicts: Public Participationin Managing the Solid Waste Crisis, 1(2)
GAlA Ecol. Persp. Sci. Hum. & Economics 84 (1992).
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which is basically derived from formal decision analysis, 15 but
oriented toward a multi-actor, multi-value and multi-interest situation.
To integrate these multi-dimensional aspects of decision making
into a practical procedure the model assigns specific tasks to different
groups in society. These groups represent three forms of knowledge:
* knowledge based on common sense and personal
experience,
* knowledge based on technical expertise, and
* knowledge derived from social interests and advocacy.
These three forms of knowledge are integrated into a sequential
procedure in which different actors of society are given specific tasks
that correspond to their specific knowledge potentials. The model
entails three consecutive steps: The first step in policy or decision
making is often the identification of objectives or goals that the process
should serve once a problem is identified or a political program is
established. 16 The identification of concerns and objectives is best
accomplished by asking all relevant stakeholder groups (i.e., socially
organized groups that are or perceive themselves as being affected by
the decision) to reveal their values and criteria for judging different
options. This can be done by using a process called value-treeanalysis. 17 The evaluative criteria derived from the value-trees are then
operationalized and transformed into indicators by the research team or
an external expert group. With different policy options and criteria
available, experts representing varying academic disciplines and
viewpoints about the issue in question are asked to judge the
performance of each option on each indicator. For this purpose, we have
developed a special method called the group delphi. 18 It is similar to
15 Howard Raiffa, Decision Analysis (1970); Ralph L Keeney & Howard Raiffa,
Decisions with Multiple Objectives and Value Tradeoffs (1976); Detlof von
Winterfeldt, Value Tree Analysis: An Introduction and an Application to Offihore
Oil Drilling, in Insuring and Managing Hazardous Risks: From Seveso to Bhopal and
Beyond 439 (P. R. Kleindorfer & H. C. Kunreuther eds. 1987); and Kan Chen & J.C.
Mathes, Value Oriented Social Decision Analysis: A Communication Tool for Public
Decision Making on Technological Projects, in Social Decision Methodology for

Technological Projects 111 (C. Vlek & G. Cvetkovich eds.1989).

16 Miley W. Merkhofer, Comparative Analysis of Formal Decision-Making

Approaches,in Risk Evaluation and Management 183, (V.T. Covello, J. Menkes &J.
Mumpower eds. 1984).
17 Ralph L. Keeney et al., Die Wertbaumanalyse. Entscheidungshilfe ffir die Politik
(1984).

18

Ortwin Renn & Ulrich Kotte, Umfassende Bewertung der vier Pfade der
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the original delphi exercise but based on group interactions instead of
individual written responses.
The last step is the evaluation of each option profile by a group or
several groups of randomly selected citizens. This procedure has been
developed by Peter Dienel1 9 in Germany and - with a slightly
different emphasis - by Ned Crosby in the U.S. 2 0 We refer to these
panels as "Citizen Panels for Policy Evaluation and Recommendation."
The objective is to provide citizens an opportunity to learn about
technical and political facets of policy options and to enable them to
discuss and evaluate these options and their likely consequences
according to their own set of values and preferences. The idea is to
conduct a process loosely analogous to a jury trial with experts and
stakeholders as witnesses and advisors on procedure as "professional"
judges. For meaningful and productive discourse, the number of
participants is limited to about 25. Discourse proceeds in citizen panels
with the research team as discussion leaders who guide the group
through structured sessions of information, personal self-reflection and
consensus building.
Figure 2 is a schematic illustration of the cooperative discourse
process as organized for the siting decision in Aargau.

Enquete - Kommission auf der Basis eines Indikatorkatalogs, in Energie im
Brennpunkt 190 (G. Albrecht & H-U. Stegelmann eds. 1984); and Thomas Webler et
al., The Group Delphi: A Novel Attempt at Reducing Uncertainty, 39 Tech.
Forecasting & Soc. Change 253 (1991).
19 Peter C. Dienel, Die Planungszelle (1978); and Peter C. Dienel, Contributing to
Social Decision Merthodology: Citizen Reports on Technological Projects, in Social
Decision Methodology for Technological Projects 253 (C. Vlek & C. Cvetkovich
eds. 1989).
20 Ned Crosby, Implementing Citizen Panels: A Ten Year Program of Political
Reform, unpublished (1986); and Ned Crosby, J. M. Kelly & P. Schaefer, Citizen
Panels: A New Approach to Citizen Participation,46 Public Adm. Rev. 170 (1986).
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Figure 2
Decision and Participation Process to Prioritize Landfill Sites
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In late October 1992, the town councils (Gemeinder~ite) of the
communities in which the potential sites were located were invited to
send one member of the town council to serve on an oversight
committee (Behbirdendelegation). The oversight committee consisted
of one member of each town council and the Director of the Building
Department. Sites located near boundaries were represented by two
communities. All but one community opted to send a member of the
council to the committee. The one town that did not participate also
abstained from selecting representatives for the citizen panels. The
oversight committee had the legitimate right to make the final
recommendation to the Building Department. In addition, they were
asked to inform the public about the site selection process, to review
and critique the participation process, and to select the representatives
from each of their communities for the citizen panels.
The selection of representatives for the citizen panels differed from
our theoretical approach. Rather than use random selection, we gave the
oversight committee the task to recruit and select citizen participants.
The sponsoring agency was concerned about the legitimacy of the
recommendations issued by the panels and felt that random selection
would not be seen as a legitimate way of choosing representatives.
Using lotteries as a political means of achieving equity is alien to the
Swiss political culture. In substitution we proposed that either a town
meeting or the community government nominate the representatives,
with some assistance by the research team to encourage consideration of
all relevant social and political viewpoints. We asked each community
to select eight representatives.
Once representatives were chosen, all were asked to attend a first
general meeting in January 1993. The Director of the Building
Department outlined the selection task; one of the authors, Ortwin
Renn, introduced the procedure and rules of discourse. Then four
panels were formed, each consisting of two representatives from each
potential site community, and each was given identical tasks:
* review the past mapping - elimination process;
* review and interpret the technical feasibility analyses that
were undertaken by engineering companies parallel to
the deliberation period;
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*

consider social, political, ecological and economic
impacts and equity issues including benefit sharing
packages;
• develop criteria for evaluating sites;
* make a suggestion for 3-5 eligible sites; and
* develop a priority list of sites for further investigation.
The Building Department was also interested to have the panels
recommend a set of criteria suitable for evaluating future landfill sites.
Results of the Discourse Process
Each panel met for three hours on one weekday evening, every two
or three weeks over a period of six months. In the first meeting of each
panel, Renn discussed the rules of discourse, the desired procedure for
making final decisions and the moderation process. All four panels
unanimously adopted the suggested rules and asked the research team
to moderate each session (among the moderators were Renn and Hans
Kastenholz, another author). Although we proposed consensus, to our
surprise, the panels rejected it as a decision rule for placing communities
on the priority list, arguing that consensus was politically impractical.
Panelists also felt it would place too much pressure on the
representatives of selected sites to vote with all the others once the
group had come to a convincing conclusion. All panels voted
unanimously that they wanted a voting procedure based on some kind
of qualified majority vote. Yet, interestingly, all four panels reached
consensus in their final verdict in spite of initial skepticism.
Between January and June 1993, the panels met seven to nine times
before they attended a two-day workshop to come up with the final
decision. With the exception of one community, every town sent eight
people to the panels. Not a single one of these dropped out. During the
first half of the process, most emphasis was placed on informing the
citizens about the problem of waste disposal and educating them about
potential risks and problems a landfill can cause. They received a
brochure in question-and-answer format prepared by a member of the
research team and validated by a team of technical experts. Several
experts were invited to talk about technical or economic issues, and the
results of geological surveys were conveyed to the panelists by the
principal investigators of the engineering companies who made the
7 Risk Health, Safety & Environment 145 [Spring 1996]

surveys. In June of 1993, the research team conducted a group delphi
with ten experts on landfills and asked the group to provide best
scientific estimates on all those indicators that demand physical
measurements or highly professional judgments. The results of this
group delphi was given to the panelists.
Before making final assessments of each site on each criterion,
panelists had the opportunity to visit each site, talk to geologists at the
site and ask questions of local representatives. During and after this
process of obtaining information, each panel was instructed to come up
with their own value tree and to compute a single quantitative
assessment of each site. For this purpose, participants weighted each
branch of the tree and evaluated each site on each indicator. The
procedure is taken from MAU analysis as described in Watson 21 or
von Winterfeldt & Edwards. 22 This task was quite substantial. One
panel's tree had fifty indicators. Each of the nine potential sites were
evaluated on each indicator, making for as many as 450 evaluations.
The result was a numerical characterization of each potential site. Since
each panel adopted the same construction principle for their value trees
(main criteria were: impacts to humans, impacts to nature, impacts to
society and economic costs), it is possible to directly compare the
results of the four panels as in Figure 3.
Each panel accepted the priority list that the MAU procedure
suggested and articulated a consensual recommendation. Although all
four panels recommended the same first priority site, they had
differences in the order of the remaining priorities. To resolve this
conflict, each panel appointed five representatives to a superpanel that
met in September 1993 and issued a consensual list of five sites, two
adjacent to each other. This list was later approved by the oversight
committee and forwarded to the Building Department.

S. R. Watson, Multiattribute Utility Theory for Measuring Safety, 10 Eur. J.
Operational Res. 77 (1982).
22 Detlof von Winterfeldt & Ward Edwards, Decision Analysis and Behavioral
Research (1986).
21
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Figure 3
The MAU Analysis for Each Panel and Potential Site on the Four Main Criteria
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In December 1993, the result of the participation process was made
public and the Canton's government entered Phase 3 of the process by
initiating further tests at the selected sites. Unfortunately the Canton
did not honor the order of the remaining sites but started a new
characterization process giving all five sites equal weight. As a result the
inhabitants of the site with the lowest ranking announced fierce
opposition against this procedure, while the other towns allowed further
investigation and screening. This process is still ongoing.
Evaluation of Fairness
Fairness in our model has two components: substantive and
procedural fairness. Defining substantive fairness is part of the
deliberation process, but our rules require that any deviation from an
egalitarian distribution needs justification. Procedural fairness refers to
the opportunity of all affected persons to take part in decision making
and to make claims and demand justification of claims made by others.
There are four fundamental actions that every participant must be free
to take: attend, initiate, discuss and decide. These refer in a discourse
setting to four essential tasks: selection of participants, agenda setting,
rule making, moderation and rule enforcement.
With respect to substantive fairness, we introduced our default
option and made it clear that failure to reach a conclusion would mean
that each community would be back on its own. Participants intensely
discussed these issues. Although most shared the opinion that some
communities need to take more risks for the common good, there were
clear indications that such an altruistic approach was contingent on
several conditions spelled out during the value tree exercises.
All groups placed a fairly high value on distributing burdens on
those who produce the highest amount of waste. At the same time, they
accepted the criterion that a site that is already burdened by other
hazardous facilities should be spared. They opted for a balanced model
of equity by contribution and need (Similar results were obtained in an
Austrian case study on hazardous waste disposal, see article by Joanne
Linnerooth-Bayer in this volume). All groups were convinced that a
substantial health risk was unacceptable regardless whether is was
distributed equally among all contributors or not. Participants
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demanded that the risk be reduced to a degree that serious health
impacts were avoided. Once they perceived that this point was reached,
fairness isues received focal attention. Fairness issues were then selected
as indicators in each group, but with varying degrees of relative weights.
'While groups 1 and 2 placed most emphasis on the technical criteria,
groups 3 and 4 assigned fairly high weights to equity considerations.
Most differences among the four groups could be explained by the
difference in relative weights given to technical versus social criteria (the
social criteria included the fairness aspects).
In addition to including some criteria of substantive fairness in the
decision tree, the issue of compensation came up during the discussion
and was resolved in an unusual manner. Rather than paying monetary
compensation to a community or its citizens (which was regarded as
distributing brides), all four panels favored a model of joint ownership
of the facility by the Canton and the selected community. Such joint
ownership provides two major benefits for the community: sharing the
revenues (the prices for waste disposal are administered in Switzerland
thus assuring some profits for each waste management facility) and
sharing control. This suggestion was widely accepted by the groups
although the final decision was left to the representatives of the host
community. Since several potential host communities are still under
investigation, a final decision on joint ownership has not been made yet.
Judging procedural equity is more complex: The selection process
for the panels was different from our model of random sampling.
Although we issued clear guidelines for selecting citizens, some towns
asked for volunteers, others looked for opinion leaders, and still others
asked the politically active to participate. Three communities made the
deliberate approach to make a selection according to the degree to
which these people might be affected by a landfill. We cannot judge
the representativeness of the selection, nor do we know if the selection
of represented interests show any systematic bias. For example, we had
less than 20% women among the participants. We also believe that we
had better educated people in our panels than one might expect from a
random sample. Yet, average education levels are much higher in
Switzerland than, e.g., in the U.S. Other biases were not obvious.
Fairness within the panels was less of a problem. To protect the
participants from unruly behavior and to enable the panels to have
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direction and focus, the panels agreed to be run by facilitators from the
research team. The citizens agreed to accept the appointed facilitators,
but they did not surrender the right to remove the moderator at some
latter point in time. None of the moderators were ever replaced.
During the first meeting, the research team suggested a list of rules for
conduct. These were meant to encourage a safe, non-aggressive,
cooperative spirit during the panel discussions. These rules were
adopted - out of common sense - by all the citizen participants
without objection. They encouraged listening and created a space in
which everyone could have their say without fear of being put down.
The facilitators made sure that people said what they meant and that
others heard what was said.
The rules explicitly included the requirement that each participant
had the same rights to make statements and to challenge statements of
others. By enforcing this rule and allowing everyone to speak, the
facilitator helped create the belief that everyone's opinion or interests
were legitimate. Individual interviews with participants revealed that
they felt positive about the panel atmosphere: that it was nonhierarchical and cooperative. One person mentioned the beneficial
effects of the setting:
I really enjoyed coming to these meetings. Although it was a
lot of work, I found it refreshing to work in a nonhierarchical atmosphere, which is open and fair. This is so
different from my workplace.
Other anecdotal evidence suggested that a group identity did
emerge over the six month period. For example, during the site visits, a
local official commented that he assumed the local citizen
representative on the panel would vote against the site. She responded
coldly that this was objective work of the panel and she was not there to
merely keep the landfill out of her town. It is difficult to verify that she
authentically was of that opinion, but it is significant that she thought it
important enough to portray herself of that mind before the other panel
members and other people from the communities.
Small working groups was another activity that promoted
procedural fairness and gave participants the opportunity to discuss
substantive aspects of fairness as well. During the evening meetings,
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small working groups of four to five participants were often used to
frame questions for experts, to list potential concerns, to estimate the
importance of different values and so on. It is known that working in
groups promotes communication and participation. People who do not
speak in the plenary often participate in small group settings. These
settings also offer people an opportunity to explain in more detail their
positions and opinions. During the first meeting we organized working
groups to come up with a list of questions for the cantonal
representative. The discussions in these groups were intense with every
member participating.
Fair procedures should also help to build trust and confidence in all
the various actors involved. Citizens' views on trust changed slightly
throughout the process. At first, they held a high degree of mistrust for
the official from the Building Department, the political institutions,
such as the Building Department and "the Canton" in general. Trust
toward the official from the department improved for one-third of the
citizens; our interviews revealed that this was because the citizens got to
know him on a personal level. Trust for the political institutions did not
improve during the process, however. This skepticism was not onesided. We experienced that many people in government and some
experts did not fully trust the citizens either. There was never strong
support for this participation process within the Building Department
with the exception of the Director (member of the Canton's
government) and the person responsible for the siting process.
Trust for the facilitator improved substantially. We hypothesize
that this result was not so much movement of mistrust to trust, but
rather removal of suspicion, as people became familiar with individual
facilitators. Personal interviews confirmed that many people strongly
trusted the facilitators and believed them to have good intentions.
In addition to the structural aspects of fairness, we had the
respondents evaluate the fairness of the process in several surveys. To
explore the citizens' subjective assessments of aspects of the process
which are associated with the major goals of fairness and competence,
we asked the participants about their opportunities to bring their values,
interests and concerns into the discourse. We handed out written
questionnaires to all participants at the beginning of the process, shortly
before the final evaluations were made, at the end of the process and six
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months later. More than 70% returned the first three questionnaires,
slightly more than 50% the last questionnaire. Figure 4 shows the
distribution of ratings for subjective evaluation of fairness in four
consecutive surveys. (In the last survey, not a single respondent was
convinced that the process was unfair.)
Figure 4
Evaluation of Fairness of the Partidpation Process by Panelists
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All participants entered the process with high expectations of
fairness. Over the six month period, negative evaluations vanished,
while positive evaluations stabilized. However, a more skeptical
evaluation was observed immediately before participants made the final
selection. They were probably uncertain of how their own hometown
would be evaluated. Six months after the process, the positive
impression was again overwhelming. Nobody questioned the fairness of
the process. At the same time, however, extremely positive evaluations
became more moderate.
Overall 80% of the respondents of the last survey agreed with the
list of priorities that the Superpanel had suggested. This is rather
astounding because 72% of the respondents were originally convinced
that their respective home communities were not suitable. All panelists
without exception agreed that the list sites they had produced in their
respective panel was justified and well-selected. In contrast to our
expectations, people representing priority sites were even more positive
in backing the decisions of the panels. This could be interpreted as a
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manifestation of avoiding cognitive dissonance, but it could also show a
strong degree of commitment to the result of a process to which the
respondents developed some faith.
Condusions
We began this article by pointing out that, procedural and
substantive fairness have to be integrated in one model of decision
making. Our model is inspired by the idea that the default option is
equal distribution of resources not the status quo. We leave the selection
of one of the substantive fairness principles to the deliberation process
provided that each deviation from egalitarian distribution is justified by
arguments. Procedural equity is accomplished through random
selection of participants (if this is possible) or at least a selection
procedure that guarantees the participation of most interests and values.
Fairness demands that each party has the same right to participate and
to make claims. Within the discourse setting moderation, agenda
setting, rule creation and rule enforcement are part of the consensual
decision making process. Rules for redeeming claims and for finding
agreements need to be established in the beginning of the discourse
process by the facilitators to assure competence and an atmosphere of
seriousness. But these rules need to be approved by all participants.
Our model of citizen panels is only one of many possible ways to
involve the public in decision making and policy designing. It is
characterized by several features usually not found in other proposals
for citizen involvement. 23 In contrast to joint commissions of experts
and citizens, in this model each participating group is assigned a specific
function. In contrast to negotiations with stakeholder groups, our
model of participation is inspired by the normative goal of a fair and
impartial representation of all citizens' values and preferences, be they
organized or not. There are, of course, limitations to this approach.
Cf Daniel J. Fiorino, Citizen Participationand Environmental Risk: A Survey
of Institutional Mechanisms, 15 Sci. Tech. & Hum. Values 226 (1990); Carol
Pateman, Participation and Democratic Theory (1970); Stuart Langton, Citizen
Participation in America: Current Reflections On State Of the Art, in Citizen
Participation in Public Decision Making 1 (J. DeSario & S. Langton eds. 1987);
Michael Pollak, Public Participation,in Regulating Industrial Risk 76 (H. Otway &
M. Peltu eds. 1985); and Mary G. Kweit & Robert W. Kweit, The Politics of Policy
Analysis: The Role of Citizen Participation in Analytic Decision Making, in Citizen
Participation in Public Decision Making 19 (J. DeSario & S. Langton eds. 1987).
23
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Based on our experiences2 4 with panels in Germany, the U.S. and the
Swiss case study reported here, the following criteria should be used to
evaluate the suitability of our proposed procedure:
• Variability of options:. Do the participants have the
choice of selecting one option out of a variety of options
that are all feasible in the specific situation? Yes-no situations
are likely to be resolved by "no" because it provides the
easiest way to consensus. The default option of egalitarian
distribution is, however, a powerful agent to avoid status
quo conservatism.
* Equity of exposure: Are all groups of the community or
the respective constituency exposed in some way to the
potential disadvantages of the proposed options (to avoid a
distinction between more or less affected citizens)? The only
way to introduce merit or contribution is by changing the
opportunity rate for participation. Members of the more
affected groups should enjoy a higher probability of being
drafted than members of the less affected groups. Although
we have tried this selection rule in the past, experiences with
stratified samples were not too encouraging (1991).
* Personal experience: Do participants have some
experience with the problem and do they feel competent
about giving recommendations after they are further
educated about the problem and the remedial options? Our
Swiss example demonstrates that laypeople can develop the
necessary degree of self-confidence to make competent and
prudent judgments. The subject of solid waste is certainly a
topic that is simple enough to make the consequences of
different choices transparent to non-professionals. Other
topics may be more difficult in this respect. Past experience,
however, has made us confident about the ability of normal
citizens to process complex information and to understand
sophisticated problems. People's capability for making
prudent judgments is usually underestimated by most
analysts as well as politicians. The cognitive limits of a
cooperative discourse are yet to be determined. Our case
studies in Germany and the U.S. are further proof that lack
of knowledge or of intelligibility was never a serious issue
(1985 and 1993).
* Personal relevance: Do participants judge the problem as
serious enough to sacrifice several days of their time to work
on solutions? We had an extraordinary commitment in the
Swiss case study. Nobody dropped out and all meetings
24 Supra note 12.
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were well attended. This may be caused by the selection
process of the participants and the strong tradition for
voluntary involvement of citizens within the Swiss political
culture. In contrast, our main case study in the U.S. showed
a disappointing participation rate for randomly selected
citizens (1991).
0 Seriousness and openness of sponsor: Is the sponsor
willing to accept or at least carefully consider the
recommendations of the citizen panels or does it pursue
hidden agendas? The participants of the Swiss case study
suspecteT the Building Department to have an hidden
agenda, but were proven wrong. However, the new policy of
the Building Department to ignore the priority order for the
top candidates have revitalized some skepticism in the
communities.
* Acceptance by stakeholder groups: Using randomly
selected citizens as jurors in a policy debate depends on the
willingness of the various stakeholder groups to accept the
outcome of the panel process. Stakeholders may agree to
delegate the problem to a group of uncommited citizens if
one of the following conditions is met. First, the
stakeholders have the feeling they cannot reach a satisfactory
agreement in direct negotiation with other groups or the
political authorities. Second, they feel they have more power
when directing their arguments to uncommited citizens
rather than to charged administrators or politicians. Third,
they feel pressured by public opinion to go along with what
the public wants them to do. In all other cases, acceptance of
the citizens judgment is difficult to accomplish.
While one case study cannot validate the long-term effects of our
model on participation and fairness, it does illustrate how our model
can be used to design and evaluate public participation programs. So far
we have collected case studies in three countries. Evaluation of these
cases have taught us that several aspects of the process are instrumental
in promoting fairness and competence:
* Giving everyone in the affected population a chance to
*
*

gparticipate;

building an atmosphere that encourages people to
discuss anything that come to their minds and to
criticize or challenge anything that anyone else says;
agreeing on a means to resolve disagreements before
they arise;
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*

giving people the right to ask for new discussion
leaders or experts and to influence the agenda;
* giving people time between the meetings to discuss the
result of each meeting with their constituents, but
reserving at least a day or two days for finalizing the
recommendations;
* organizing a group delphi to clarify expert certainty and
uncertainty;
* providing expert witnesses to educate the participants;
* providing pre-reviewed informational material; and
* visiting e potential sites.
The central tenet to keep in mind with public participation projects
is that the public is in principle capable and wise in making prudent
decisions. Public input is essential to make the right decision, not only
strategically necessary to gain acceptance. The rationality of public
input depends, however, on the procedure of involvement. Provided
citizens are given a conducive and supportive structure for discourse,
they are capable to understand and process risk-related information and
to articulate well-balanced recommendations. Our model of
participation is one attempt to empower citizens to become more
competent in making collective decisions, to promote a fair distribution
of resources and risks and to provide a procedure of decision making
that provides equal opportunities to all citizens affected by the outcome
of such a decision.

